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PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF PERSONS
ACCUSED OF CRIME*
SHELDON GLuECK
Again and again we have had our attention drawn to the evil
features of the law's treatment of mental disorder in criminal
cases. The object of this discussion is to call attention to a very
important piece of legislation regarding the psychiatric examina-
tion of certain classes of persons accused of crime, the principle
of which has for the first time in American legal history been
enacted into law.
In spite of the long-standing disagreement between the legal
and medical professions on the question of the relationship of
mental unsoundness to criminal responsibility and punishability,
there is some evidence that the differences between the two pro-
fessions are giving way before a spirit of intelligent co-operation.1
The conscious attempt scientifically to treat a problem that has
long vexed jurists-the determination of the status of the of-
fender who is possibly mentally unsound-is especially manifest
in recent Massachusetts legislation, providing for the psychiatric
* Read before the section on Economic and Social Problems, American
Society for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia, Dec. 29, 1926.
1 See S. Glueck, A Tentative Program of Co-operation Between Psychia-
trists and Lawyers (1925) 9 MENTAL HYGIENE, 686. The fact that prac-
tically all of the numerous "crime commissions" which have recently been
established are apparently making efforts to give practical study to the
r6le of psychiatry in the administration of criminal justice supports the
above contention. Unfortunately, the opposite attitude is still strong, as
witness the recent opinion of the Chief Justice of the highest Massachusetts
court in an appealed case in which counsel tried to raise the question of
defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense:
"The judge who denied the motion presided over the jury trial, saw the
defendant, heard him testify in his own behalf, and of course watched his
apparent mental capacity as revealed under direct and cross-examination-
and by his other conduct during the trial. The judge may well have been
able to form a judgment as to legal responsibility of the defendant for
crime, based upon common sense inferences and intelligent observation,
more reliable as a practical guide to accomplishment of justice than the
refined distinctions and technical niceties of alienists and experts on psy-
chopathic inferiority." Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 153 N. E. 881, at 882
(Mass. 1926).
To speak of "common sense inferences" with regard to so intricate a
problem as a person's mental condition is naive. If a question as to the
specifications, condition, etc., of a bridge or house were involved in litiga-
tion an appellate tribunal would hardly leave it to "common sense infer-
ences" of the trial judge, where engineering or building experts disagreed
with the judge's inspirational solution of the problem.
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examination as a matter of course or routine of certain classes
of persons accused of crime.
It should be pointed out that we are not at present discussing
the vexing problem of the "plea of insanity," which involves a
legal attack upon the prosecution's case, based on the absence,
at the timhe of the alleged offense, of the requisite mental ele-
ment in the definition of crime.2 Indeed, we are rather inter-
ested in the possibility of eliminating trials, or at least reducing
them to a mere formality, in cases where the Massachusetts
procedure about to be described offers a more rational instru-
ment for the solution of the problems involved, from the points
of view of the offender and the community, than is presented by
the tangled web of legislation and case law that now constitutes
the "defense of insanity."
THE MASSACHUSETTS LAW "IN BOOKS"
Elsewhere 3 the old English law and the existing state legisa-
tion on the subject of determining the mental condition of ac-
cused persons awaiting trial has been described in detail and
analyzed. Suffice it to say here that that analysis disclosed a
serious weakness in such legislation, namely, that hintiation of
proceedings for mental examination of persons accused of crime
is everywhere, except in Massachusetts, left to persons untrained
in psychiatry. 4 In other words, it is largely a pure matter of
chance, or of the strategy of the defendant's counsel, as to
whether or not the defendant is given a mental examination be-
fore or during trial unless his symptoms are strikingly sug-
gestive of the "raving maniac" or the "driveling idiot."
The unique measure passed by the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts several years ago 3 constitutes the most radical step yet
taken to provide for the mental examination of accused persons
awaiting trial. It is attracting not only local, but European
interest. It is the first piece of legislation that aims at making
the mental examination of those indicted for certain classes of
crimes a routine nwtter not dependent upon the expert knowl-
edge, alertness, desire or caprice of those temporarily in charge
of the accused. Theoretically, at least, all pcrso2s who fall
2 For a complete discussion of this problem from the points of view of
Ethics, Psychology, Psychiatry and Law, see S. GLUECi, MENTAL Disorm
AND THE CRnimNAL LAW (1925).
3 See S. Glueck, State Legislation Providing for thel MAntal Examnination
of Persons Accused of Crinc (1924) 8 MENTAL HYGIENE, 1.
4 It is extremely doubtful whether even the average jail physician, with-
out special training and experience in psychiatry, is qualified to pass upon
the mental condition of detained persons.
5 The passage of this pioneer piece of legislation is largely due to the
vision and ceaseless efforts of Dr. L. Vernon Briggs of Boston.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
within one of the three categories mentioned by the law must be
mentally examined before trial, whether or not they exhibit
symptoms of mental abnormality recognizable by the non-ex-
pert in mental diseases, i. e., the police officer, jail warden, coun-
sel for the defense, prosecuting attorney or judge.
Moreover, when once the psychiatric examination is called
for, the Massachusetts law avoids the inefficient or cumbersome
procedure and machinery for such examination that exists in
other jurisdictions. Thus, in some states, it is left to the dis-
cretion of the court how to determine the question of supposed
mental unfitness for trial, if that question happens to be raised;
in others, the judge, taking such evidence as he may desire, is
required to conduct an inquiry into accused's mental condition
when the point is properly brought up. In a number of states
it is within the judge's discretion whether or not he shall try
this preliminary "issue" of the defendant's mental condition
at the time of the proposed trial in chief. Some states specifi-
cally provide for a jury to pass upon the alleged "insanity" of an
accused person who is in confinement under indictment, this pre-
liminary hearing being in the nature of an elaborate technical
trial, precisely as if the main issue, the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, were being considered. In one state the inquiry may
be made by' the court, or a commission appointed by it, or a
special jury. In a few New England states the court may send
the accused to a hospital for observation, if it believes that the
technical "defense" of a "plea of insanity" is to be filed in the
case; one or two states provide for an inquiry either by two
"qualified physicians" or by a commission composed of two physi-
cians and a lawyer.6
The objections to these types of procedure are plain. Ob-
viously, a jury is unfit to settle a medical question; for it must
be remembered that, strictly speaking, we are not at this stage
concerned with the question of technical guilt or innocence-a
jury problem-but with mental capacity to undergo trial and
with the avoidance of a long-drawn, expensive trial where a
more sensible disposition of a case can be made. Further, the
procedure we are criticizing duplicates a jury trial; since, if the
defendant is found by the first jury to be "sane" at the time of
such trial, he is tried again, either by the same jury or another,
on the main issue of guilt or innocence. Where experts are ap-
pointed by the court, it is doubtful in many cases whether they
have the proper qualifications in the way of education and ex-
perience, unless these are specifically and stringently defined by
statute. Besides, all the methods of appointing experts and of
6The citations to the statutes mentioned in this paragraph are to be
-found in GLTJCK, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 3. The laws themselves are col-
lected in the appendix thereto.
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conducting technical hearings before the court smack too much
of a trial on the main issue of guilt or innocence; and the prin-
cipal object-that of sorting out those defendants on whom the
excpense and time of a trial would be wasted, and 'whom it is"
inhumane to try-would thus seem largely to be defeated.
We shall see, however, that the Massachusetts law is easily
the most far-sighted piece of legislation yet passed on this sub-
ject. This statute went into effect in September, 1921, and has
since been twice amended. The law at present provides in part
that:
"Whenever a person is indicted by a grand jury for a capital
offense or whenever a person, who is known to have been in-
dicted for any other offense more than once or to have been
previously convicted of a felony, is indicted by a grand jury or
bound over for trial in the superior court, the clerk of the court
in which the indictment is returned, or the clerk of the district
court or the trial justice, as the case may be, shall give notice
to the department of mental diseases, and the department shall
cause such person to be examined with a view to determine his
mental condition and the existence of any mental disease or de-
fect which would affect his criminal responsibility. The depart-
ment shall file a report of its investigation with the clerk of the
court in which the trial is to be held, and the report shall be
accessible to the court, the district attorney, and to the attorney
for the accused." 7
In the first place, this act eliminates the objectionable fea-
tures present in all other state legislation on the subject; that is,
the classes of offenders mentioned in the law are examined as a
matter of course, the procedure applying to all such offenders.
Further, the examinations are made by a neutral, unbiased
agency-the State Department of Mlental Diseases-its experts
trained and experienced in psychiatry; and the examinations are
made before trial, and before it is decided whether or Wot to
resort to the frequently-abused "defense of insanity." Moreover,
the examination is not a technicality-ridden procedure, before a
judge and in the presence of the district attorney or before a
judge and jury, such as in other jurisdictions really amounts to
7 Mass. Acts 1921, c. 415, as amended by Mass. Acts 1923, c. 331, and
Mass. Acts 1925, c. 169, of which the foregoing is an extract. The original
law further provided that the report "shall be admissible as evidence of the
mental condition of the accused," but was amended to omit this aiid pro-
vide that "Any clerk of court or trial justice who wilfully neglects to per-
form any duty imposed upon him by this section shall be punished by a fine
of not more than fifty dollars." It is not believed that the change with
reference to the admissibility of the report as evidence will militate materi-
ally against the effectiveness of this law in actual practice (nor has it
done so to date) as the act still leaves great opportunity to the court,
prosecutor and defense counsel for obtaining the facts in an unbiased
manner to guide them in their subsequent procedure with the case.
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a special trial preceding the trial-in-chief on the issue of guilt,
a procedure which is bound to interfere with any scientific ex-
amination of the defendant. It is no more fitting that a psy-
chiatric examination be made in open court and under rules of
evidence than that a patient with possible diphtheria be brought
into court on a stretcher and examined subject to the eagle eye
of judge or jury, and the non-medical majesty of the law .
That the provision for such routine mental examination as is
provided in Massachusetts ought to result in the accumulation
of valuable scientific data on the subject of the mental make-up
of the recidivist is apparent. But more immediate and practical
results are to be expected from such a law. In the first place,
the mentally unsound can be spared the ordeal of a trial. In
the second, the state and its officers will be saved the great ex-
penditure of time, effort and money involved in the prosecution
of those who ought not to be tried, in cases where the findings
of the unbiased experts, appointed by a perfectly neutral agency
before trial, are accepted by the defendant's counsel, the district
attorney, and the court, as a working basis for the disposition
of the case without formal trial, by nol-prossing or filing the
case and committing the defendant to a hospital for the mentally
ill. At any rate, even in the rare case where a trial is resorted
to after the alienists report the existence of a mentally abnormal
condition, these reports by neutral psychiatrists dispose of the
need or excuse for a long-drawn trial with opposing experts.
In its place is the mere formality of a brief hearing, say from
ten minutes to an hour, resorted to merely for the purpose of
making the record complete by entering a verdict which the
court, upon the agreement of all concerned, instructs the jury
to bring in. The actual practice, when the experts report a per-
son as having a definite psychosis, varies in different parts of
the state. One district attorney may prefer to have the case
filed or to nol. pros. it, so long as the defendant is committed to
a hospital where he can do no further harm and can receive pro-
tection and treatment. Other prosecutors prefer to have the
record of a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity." The
result in both types of procedure is to commit the defendant to
a hospital until such time as he has sufficiently recovered no
longer to be a public menace.
Even in the vexing "borderline cases" of "constitutional
psychopathic inferiority," where either of the parties prefers to
continue with an elaborate trial and conflicting alienists, in spite
of the report of the neutral experts of the Department of Mental
Diseases, these unbiased reports will serve to impress upon the
district attorneys and judges that in such cases as mental defec-
tiveness, "constitutional psychopathic inferiority," and the like,
defendants should at best be regarded as only partially respon-
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sible for their conduct. We may hope, as a result, for a more
humane, uniform and sensible disposition of the puzzling bor-
derline cases of the "semi-responsible" than is now character-
istic of most jurisdictions. Indeed, the opportunity of the exam-
iners to educate judges and prosecutors in the "psychiatric point
of view," by means of complete, clearly-presented, convincing re-
ports, cannot be over-emphasized.
If no mental condition is found and the defendant does not
admit his guilt, a trial on the merits is of course had as in other
cases.
Another great advantage of this law over legislation in other
states is that persons dangerous to the general security because
of some latent or developing mental defect or disorder, whose
condition is frequently not detected until after they have com-
mitted some shocking crime, can be discovered early in their de-
linquent careers, and the public can thus be protected before
such offenders have had further opportunity to injure society.
This is especially true in the case of the so-called "defective de-
linquent" group who, in Massachusetts, may be committed to a
special institution for such offenders, there to be held until
such time as they can with safety be discharged,-a wholly inde-
terminate period which may even amount to life incarceration.
MASSACHUSETTS LAW IN ACTION
Some of the results of a study of the cases reported for mental
examination up to and including October 15, 1926, a period of
some five years, may now be examined.
Analysis of cases psychiatrically exa~mined and those not ex-
amined. The number of cases reported by clerks of courts to the
Department of Mental Diseases for examination up to October
15 and not pending at the time was three hundred sixty-seven.
Of this number, seventy-tvo were not examined for the follow-
ing reasons: almost half had been released on bail and could
not be found when the examiners called at the place of detention;
several cases had been nol-prossed or discharged before exan-
ination; and in about one-fifth of the cases the court had im-
posed sentence before examination by the experts. Eight of
those reported for examination refused to be questioned, on ad-
vice of counsel, all but one of these having been indicted for mur-
der in the first degree. These seven constituted, however, a sur-
prisingly small percentage of the total number (173) of indict-
ments for a capital offense. In other words, counsel for defend-
ants are on the whole very co-operative. Indeed, in one case,
after the department's psychiatrists had reported that defendant
had dementia praecox, a definite psychosis, the defendant's law-
yer, who might have had a good "defense of insanity," himself
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seriously questioned the diagnosis until convinced, after several
further conversations with his client, that the latter was men-
tally ill.
Several defendants were reported for mental examination but
as they did not fall within the provisions of the law they were
not examined. Of these a few did not come within the law be-
cause they were indicted for manslaughter or second degree
murder and were therefore not in the class of "capital offenders"
provided for in the act, and several because their previous rec-
ords, so far as could be ascertained, involved only misdemeanors.
On examining the history of one offender (taken at random)
who was not mentally examined because out on bail, the following
record was disclosed:
Offense Date Disposition
1. Attempted larceny and as-
sault and battery.
2. Breaking and entering,
and larceny.
3. Breaking and entering.
4. Trespass.




8. Disturbing public assem-
bly.
9. Robbery.
10. Assault and battery.
11. Conspiracy.
12. Larceny.
13. Assault and battery.
14. Pres. game.
15. ?












1911 Five years in Mass. Re-
formatory; released in
13 months.




1916 Four years, House of
Correction; Trans-
ferred, Mass. Ref'ty,
in two months and re-
leased in 18 months.
1919 Fined $10.
1920 Filed.





Three months, House of
Correction.
Not examined because
"out on bail and court
does not know his
whereabouts."
Since then the following offenses have been found recorded
against him:
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18. Larceny. 1922 Six months, House of
Correction.
19. Disturbing the peace. 1922 Fined $5.
20. Drunk. 1922 Fined $5.
21. Drunk. 1926 Released.
This record is probably incomplete, as it represents only those
offenses to be found in the Massachusetts files and there is no
guaranty that the files, though in some respects the best of any
state in the Union, are complete as to cases running back for a
number of years or offenses committed in other jurisdictions.
It shows clearly the utter futility of the usual judicial procedure
and penal treatment in such cases, and indicates vividly the con-
tinuing social menace presented by this type of offender. Yet,
as stated, this man could not be examined under the Mlassachu-
setts law, not because he did not fall within its provisions but
because he had been released on bail and could not be found.
It is to be hoped that judges will soon see to it that such offend-
ers are not turned back to the community on bail before they
have been mentally examined.8 Indeed, the whole subject of the
actual operation of the judicial function of releasing on bail
needs careful study with a view to making the practice more
rational.
Crimes of those tmentally exained. Against the 295 accused
persons examined by the experts, there were 173 indictments for
capital offenses and six for second-degree murder or manslaugh-
ter (these six having been examined before it was established
that the law did not strictly apply to them). Nineteen indict-
ments against those examined were for sex offenses, fifty-two
for larceny, forty-six for burglary, sixteen for robbery, fourteen
8 The recently enacted chapter 320, §§ 1, 2, Blass. Acts 1926, should
remedy this situation in part. Section 1 provides that "Before the amount
of bail of a prisoner charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year is fixed in court, the court shall obtain from its
probation officer all available information relative to prior criminal prose-
cutions, if any, of the prisoner and to the disposition of each such prosecu-
tion." Section 2 provides in part as follows: "In addition to the other
duties imposed upon him, each probation officer shall, as the court may
direct, inquire into the nature of every criminal case brought before the
court under the appointment of which he acts, and inform the court, so far
as is possible, whether the defendant has previously been convicted of crime
and in the case of a criminal prosecution before said court charging a
person with an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
the probation officer shall in any event present to the court such information
as the commission on probation has in its possession relative to prior
criminal prosecutions, if any, of such person and to the disposition of each
such prosecution, and all other available information relative thereto, before
such person is admitted to bail in court and also before disposition of the
case against him by sentence, or placing on file or probation."
It is generally conceded that the records of the Massachusetts Probation
Commission are the most complete of any in the United States.
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for dangerous assault with intent to rob or kill and fifteen for
various other offenses."
Crimes of those not mentally examined. Of the seventy-two
not examined there were fifteen indictments for capital offenses,
five for second-degree murder or manslaughter (these not com-
ing within the law), five for sex offenses, twenty-three for lar-
ceny, twenty for burglary, three for robbery, three for assault
with intent to kill or rob, and six for various other offenses.
Mental condition of those examined. Surveying now the re-
ports on mental examination of the 295 accused persons exam-
ined, we find that there was reported "insanity" (i. e. a definite
major psychosis) in twenty-six cases, psychopathic personality
in eleven, mental deficiency or defective delinquency in twenty-
five, there thus being reported some abnormal mental condition
in sixty-two cases or about twenty-one per cent of those ex-
amined. Seven more were recommended for observation in a
hospital for mentally ill. This left 226 cases or seventy-six per
cent in which no evidences of mental deviation from the normal
were discovered. If one were to assume that the percentage of
cases in which a noticeable mental condition existed was the
same in those not examined as in those examined, then about
one-fifth of the seventy-two cases not mentally examined for one
reason or another, or fourteen, probably had some abnormal
mental condition.
With the exception of one, those reported "insane" were upon
such finding committed by the courts either to the hospital for
the criminal insane or to some other state hospital.
In the twenty-six cases in which the experts reported a definite
psychosis their diagnosis has in general terms been borne out
by subsequent observation in the hospitals to which defendants
were committed.
Twenty-five cases were diagnosed as mental deficients or de-
fective delinquents. The latter designation is, however, more of
a legal-psychological than a psychiatric one; since the defective
delinquent law of Massachusetts provides for the commitment,
upon the certificates of two qualified physicians, for an indeter-
minate period to the special institution for defective delinquents,
of certain mentally deficient offenders who have had a consistent
career of criminality or have proved too troublesome a disciplin-
ary problem to be coped with in the ordinary penal institution,
school for feeble-minded or hospital for the mentally ill.10
Among those found to be mentally deficient there were a
9 The total of these figures (341) does not tally with the total number
of accused persons examined (295) as a number of defendants were in-
dicted for more than one crime. The same is true of those not examined
(72) their total of crimes having been 80. Thus a total of 367 offenders
who were reported for examination were indicted for 421 offenses.
10 1 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 123, §§ 113-116.
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number of rapists and those who committed unnatural sexual
acts, murderers, and dangerous robbers and burglars. How did
the courts dispose of these mentally deficient offenders?
Disposition of mental defectives. Six of those found to be
mentally deficient were wisely committed by the courts for an
indeterminate period to the special institution for defective de-
linquents. In a number of cases, however, where the experts
declared defendants to be mentally defective, the courts did not
commit them under the defective-delinquent law, but disposed
of them in the traditional manner. Thus, to cite some examples,
one originally indicted for murder but tried for manslaughter
received one year in the house of correction. Several were sen-
tenced for indeterminate periods ranging from five-seven years
to twenty-twenty-six years in the state prison. For assault with
intent to rape, one such mentally defective defendant, aged
eighteen, received five to seven years, which means he will
shortly be released probably to continue his dangerous acts, if
one may judge from his past performances as indicated by the
following record:
He had trouble in school after the fifth grade; at twelve he was
arrested and put on probation; soon thereafter he was committed
to a state industrial school. Shortly after his discharge there-
from he was committed to the Massachusetts Reformatory, for
sodomy. On release, he enlisted in the Navy but was shortly
given a dishonorable discharge. He admits the practice of
pederasty since an early age.
Another defective delinquent, indicted for murder and con-
victed of manslaughter, received from five to ten years in prison;
still another, convicted of "carnal abuse of female child," and of
incest, received from seven to ten years in prison. That this
man will be a menace upon his discharge is indicated by the
following extracts from the summary report of the experts:
"When at home he was usually intoxicated, and had a revolver
with which he terrorized his wife and children. His abusive
conduct was known to the neighborhood. . . . He has
always been unduly sexed. . . . He is stupid in appearance
and conduct, understands only very simple questions, and ex-
hibits a typical feebleminded attitude. On a psychometric ex-
amination his highest performance is at an eight year level.
He is classified as a . . . low grade moron."
To punish a feebleminded person for a few years only to return
him again to society to continue his anti-social activities is a
mode of legal treatment which the progress of science must
eventually overthrow. From a social point of view, incarcera-
tion of mental defectives for a more or less definite term in
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prison certainly does not constitute a solution of the recurring
problems they present.
The cases against two mental defectives were "filed." These
were an indictment against one for breaking and entering in the
night-time and larceny, and two successive indictments against
the other, one being for forgery and uttering, the second for
breaking and entering at night and larceny. It would be a good
practice to have judges clearly set forth their reasons, in writing,
for placing cases on file, by way of final disposition, such signed
statement to constitute part of the record.
Disposition of "psychopathic personalities." The diagnosis in
eleven cases was "psychopathic personality" or "constitutional
psychopathic inferiority." It is noteworthy that this condition
was found in only eleven out of the 295 cases examined. This
is an interesting contradiction of those who insist that if psychi-
atrists had more to do with the criminal law, they would find
almost all criminals irresponsible, throwing them at least into
the category "constitutional psychopathic inferiority," if they
could establish no definite major psychosis. Two psychopaths
were convicted of first degree murder and appealed; and, pending
such appeal, we will not comment on them. In one " of the
eleven, a capital case, the experts called the attention of the
court and the district attorney to the defendant's condition of
"border-line" mental disorder, and these officials agreed that,
while not absolutely irresponsible for his criminal acts, such an
individual should nevertheless be considered as only partially
responsible. He was, therefore, given a life sentence. This
illustrates the kind of legitimate influence that can be exerted
by unbiased experts to educate judges and prosecutors and to
lessen the rigor of the law in cases such as this, wherein an
inflamed public opinion demanded the death penalty-a fact that
members of the jury conveyed to the district attorney in the
case after their discharge, when he had agreed to accept a plea
of second degree murder on the recommendation of the experts.
Here a -wise social disposition was made of a type of case that
has been the source of much medico-legal discussion, the problem
of the "partially-responsible." 12 The prisoner was placed for
the rest of his life where he can do no further harm; at the
same time his mental condition and limited responsibility were
considered and balanced against the legal demand of the extreme
penalty.
It is cases of this type and their possible orderly, speedy and
inexpensive disposition where a piece of legislation of the kind
'Recently a similar case was disposed of in a like manner.
:12 The whole problem of the so-called "semi-responsible" from the judicial
and psychiatric, as well as ethical, points of view is exceedingly complicated.
See GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 2.
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we are considering exists, that suggests that if a law lile the
Massachusetts statute had existed in Illinois when the Leopold-
Loeb case arose, those defendants might have been disposed of
as they finally were, but without much of the long-dravn pro-
ceedings, the rancor and misunderstanding and the needless ex-
pense of the hearing in mitigation. Had such legislation existed,
it seems highly probable that counsel for the youths would have
readily agreed to their examination by experts appointed, not by
the prosecution, nor by the defense, nor even by the court, but
by the state department of mental diseases, a body neither con-
sciously nor unconsciously connected with, nor influenced by, the
administration of criminal justice in any particular case at bar,
a state agency engaged merely in the scientific examination of
all offenders regardless of age, means, or other condition. The
report of such experts, available to all parties concerned, might
have been the basis for the disposition of the case then and there,
if the prosecution had been willing, in the light of the report
from an entirely neutral source, to acquiesce in a sentence of
life imprisonment; or, in the event the prosecutor was unwilling
to agree to such disposal of the case on the basis of the report,
the report would at least have formed the basis for the next
step in the proceedings, and might have aided the court in the
performance of its difficult task.
Some of the other cases of psychopathic personality found by
the Massachusetts experts were not disposed of quite so 'wisely,
from a broad social point of view, as was the case discussed
above. One psychopathic delinquent received onc year in the
house of correction on the following report of the experts:
"Age tvwenty-nine; divorced. . . Father deserted when
(patient) three years of age. Became a state ward; attended
school to the eighth grade.
"At eleven years sent to Lyman School as a stubborn child,
remaining for three years; then transferred to Concord Reforma-
tory, for larceny, where he stayed fourteen months; later com-
mitted to state prison, for burglary and larceny, where he served
four years; from 1908 to 1911 was in the U. S. Army; was
arrested as a deserter and served a sentence in Leavenworth.
He also served a year and one-half at Blackwell's Island, a sen-
tence at Sing Sing, and three months at Holmesburg, Pennsyl-
vania.
"Has always been of nervous make-up, troubled with insomnia,
an occasional user of morphine. Eleven days prior to arrest was
paroled from state prison.
"Mental examination shows an average intelligence, no halluci-
nations or delusions or gross evidence of insanity. Patient
shows iwrked emotioial instability, threatening suicide in case
he is convicted again.
"From his history and from our examination, we are of the
opinion that his emotional instability is pathological. While we
believe this man to be neither insane nor feebleminded in a legal
643
YALE LAW JOURNAL
sense, we believe his career to be adequately explained by a dis-
ordered personality, ordinarily classified as constitutional psycho-
pathic state."
This is the type of case with which our socio-legal engineering
has as yet utterly failed to cope. Every judge who had anything
to do with the sentencing of this person, and who read the results
of previous brief sentences, must have felt how hopelessly inade-
quate are the legal means at our command today for making a
wise social disposition of such cases. Under the law, in the
face of this report-and realizing, no doubt, what a ridiculous
palliative he was prescribing-the judge was forced to give this
man a brief sentence.
Following up the subsequent history of this prisoner, whom
the court was forced to dispose of in the archaic manner pro-
vided for by modern law, we find, as might have been prognosti-
cated, the following record:
Five months after his sentence to house of correction, he was
transferred to the prison camp and hospital, escaping therefrom
the same day. When next heard from, in May, 1924, he had
been sentenced for burglary in London, England, to five years
servitude and deportation at the end of that period.
We may confidently predict a continuation of his anti-social
career on his discharge.
Judges alone cannot be blamed if such laws as the Massachu-
setts act for the routine mental examination of certain classes
of offenders cannot fully achieve the ends for which they were
designed. The fault lies in the legislative prescription, in ad-
vance, of definite, brief sentences, under the easily-pierced dis-
guise of "indeterminate sentences," and in the failure to provide
a special penal-correctional institution for psychopathic delin-
quents."3
We cite the record of another psychopath as illustrative of the
ineffectiveness of present methods of disposition of such cases:
Offense Date Disposition
1. Larceny, bicycle. 1904 Probation six months,
2. Habitual truant. 1905 Not guilty.
3. Larceny. 1905 Not guilty.
4. Delinquency (Larceny). 1907 Probation.
1 Such an institution has long been urged as a practical necessity in
Massachusetts. It was recommended by Dr. Bernard Glueck, in his article
Concerning Prisoners (1918), 2 MENTAL HYGIENE, 177. Its need has been
recognized by progressive penologists. Psychopathic offenders present dis-
ciplinary and other problems in a penal institution that seriously affect its
efficiency with more normal offenders. Massachusetts has taken the lead
in recently establishing a separate institution for female defective delin-
quents in addition to the existing one for male defective delinquents, and it
is hoped that special institutions for psychopathic offenders will follow.
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5. Desertion and impersonat- 1918 Five years in the U. S.
ing officer. disciplinary Barracks.
6. Grand larceny. 1919 Disposition unknown.
7. Desertion. 1920 Two years in U. S. disci-
plinary Barracks.
8. Breaking and Entering, 1922 Mass. Reformatory, 5
and Larceny. years; released in 15
months.
9. Breaking and Entering. 1925 Five to seven years in
prison.
This man was of good education and intelligence. In between
offenses he had the opportunity to marry, be divorced, and re-
marry. He had a history of convulsions occurring between ages
of 21 and 23 and diagnosed as epileptic, in connection with which
there were unconscious periods. Later he had been committed
to a hospital for observation, the result being a diagnosis of
"psychopathic personality." The experts of the Department also
diagnosed him as a psychopathic personality. He will doubtless
continue his anti-social activities on his discharge.
Another psychopath convicted of breaking and entering and
larceny was in 1923 sentenced to the state reformatory on a five-
year "indeterminate" sentence, released in sixteen months on
parole, and is at present "wanted" for violation of parole.
Anyone who has studied the anti-social careers of psychopaths
must admit that these cases are quite typical. In all such cases
and in most of the cases of defective offenders, the best of laws
can do but little until society, through its machinery for legal
regulation of the social order, decides to take the radical step
of incarcerating such unstable offenders for a wholly indetermi-
nate period, its actual length to depend not upon the wishes of
the trial judge-who has had little opportunity, if any, to study
the prior history of the offender and his development under
penal and correctional treatment-but on the judgment, either
of psychiatric and social workers attached to and informing the
court, or of highly trained prison officials who can study the
behavior of the offender over a long period of time, and who
it would seem are logically the ones to say when such offenders
can reasonably be expected to make good in society.
Criticil, of the 1aw. A brief criticism of the law is not out
of place by way of conclusion. First, it applies, under the first
category, only to capital offenders, thus making no provision for
second-degree murderers or for those indicted for manslaughter.
Under the second category-consisting of persons known to have
been indicted for any other offense more than once-those pre-
viously indicted but once cannot be examined. In the third cate-
gory-of persons previously convicted of a felony-criminals
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with long records of misdemeanors are not included. 14 It is well
known that the most promising material for the study of recidi-
vism is among those who for various causes have had a long
career as petty offenders. The line between misdemeanor and
felony is, after all, artificial, when the distinction is considered
from the psychiatric point of view; and the relationship of the
mental condition to the illegal act is equally important in misde-
meanor and felony.
Secondly, the reporting of the cases depends upon the clerks
of the courts, who are not compelled to make such reports if
they do not, in the language of the statute, know of the previous
records of offenders. Thus clerks can always claim, by way of
excuse for failure to report cases, that they had not the knowl-
edge of prior offenses. Obviously, out of the large number of
cases that have come up since the law went into effect, more than
367 should have been reported for examination. That failure to
report for examination all the cases falling within the provisions
of the law resulted in useless expenditure of time and money and
in the unnecessary subjection of at least some who were mentally
,ill to the ordeal of a trial, is illustrated by this fact: A careful
check-up on those persons sentenced to the state prison during
the operation of the law, who had not been reported for mental
examination before trial, discloses that at least five convicts
among those who had to be transferred from prison to mental
hospitals because they were found to be suffering from mental
disease, developed symptoms within such a brief period after
their sentence to prison as to force us to the conclusion that a
mental examination before trial would have disclosed the disease
and probably have rendered the trial and imprisonment unneces-
sary. These prisoners, instead of being committed directly to
the hospital where they belonged, had to pass through the waste-
ful, roundabout route of criminal court and prison to their ulti-
mate destination.
In view of the foregoing, the law should be amended to place
upon the probation officer the duty of informing the clerk as to
the prior record of offenders, so that clerks cannot shirk their
responsibility by saying they had no such knowledge. Indeed,
with the existence of a state-wide record system there is no ex-
cuse for clerks of court not being able to furnish judges with
prior records of offenders; such records being basic to any
rational disposal of cases.
14 This gap is, however, now being effectively filled by another piece of
legislation and machinery in which Massachusetts has again taken the lead,
namely, the law of Sept. 1, 1924 (Mass Acts 1924, c. 309) providing for the
psychiatric and social investigation of inmates in the jails and houses of
correction who are serving a sentence of thirty days or over (except for
non-payment of fine) and those who have a prior record of commitment to
any penal institution.
PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
Finally, some of the cases we have discussed indicate that it
will be some time before trial judges co-ordinctc their disposition
of cases with the experts' reports on such cases. The question,
in other words, is the fundamental one of co-operative interrela-
tion of all the agencies that deal with the offender from the
moment of his arrest to the time of his ultimate return to
society. This is probably the most fundamental problem to be
solved in the practical field of the administration of criminal
justice, and is perhaps a major reason for the much-vaunted
superiority of European law-enforcement machinery.
In spite of these patent defects of the Massachusetts law, how-
ever, it should be reiterated that this provision for the routine
mental examination of persons accused of crime, even as it stands
today, is far in advance of any similar legislation in any state
of the Union. Its efficient principle is to reduce to a minimum
the tral of persons who, because of mental abnormality, can
more wisely, cheaply and speedily be disposed of without a
formal trial. It eliminates the objectionable feature common to
all other state legislation on the subject-namely, the leaving of
the mental examination of offenders to chance or caprice instead
of, as in Massachusetts, making it a prcscribcd, scicatific, va-
biased procedure in every case of certain classes. It serves as
a reliable aid to the prosecutor in advising him as to which cases
it would be useless, or at least needlessly expensive, to try rather
than to commit forthwith. The practice generally is to place on
file a case in which the experts of the Department of Mental Dis-
eases have reported a serious mental condition, and to have the
defendant committed to a hospital. If he ever recovers, he may
of course, theoretically, again be placed on trial. Usually, how-
ever, the condition of one reported mentally ill is such as to
require long treatment and his more or less permanent incarcera-
tion, for the good of himself and the safety of the community.
It is true that occasionally a prosecutor may insist upon a trial
even in a case where the Department's unbiased reports finds the
defendant suffering from mental disease; but in such an event
this is usually done, as we have said, only for the purpose of
closing the record, the "trial" being a mere brief formality. In
such cases the jury is instructed to find the defendant "not guilty
by reason of insanity," the defendant is straightway comritted
to an appropriate hospital, and the case is closed. Thus another
advantage of the Massachusetts law is that it makes for a much
better understanding than has hitherto existed between practical
workers in the legal and medical professions as to the perplexing
question of the criminal irresponsibility of the mentally ill.
In addition the law has brought about a marked diminution in
the use of conflicting alienists in insanity cases; for the unbiased
status of the experts who make the examinations-they being
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employed not by either side nor even by the court, but by the
State Department of Mental Diseases-has put them at a distinct
advantage over partisan experts. But perhaps the most im-
portant though least obvious r0le which is being played by the
unique Massachusetts law is that of harbinger of a new criminal
procedure toward which, it would seem, the advance of crimino-
logical knowledge will gradually force us; namely, the basing of
the offender's treatment in all cases-both as to length and type-
not on the mechanical dosages of punishment prescribed by legis-
latures in advance, but on the rational exercise of judicial dis-
cretion enlightened by the scientific reports of psychiatric,
psychological and sociological experts who should form an indis-
pensable adjunct of the criminal courts of tomorrow.
